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Early Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism

The Mahāyāna Context of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā

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inter-relationships, but rather to give some brief flavor of the philosophical (or perhaps theological) tradition with which the GK aligns itself. As we have seen from the first chapter (dealing with the textual questions such as the date and authorship of the GK), the status of the early Vedānta as a philosophical school (*darśana*) and the precise nature of its doctrines are somewhat unclear. This is largely due to the fact that our best source of knowledge on such matters are not Vedāntic texts themselves but the work of Buddhist scholars such as Bhāvaviveka, the author of the earliest known compendium of Indian philosophies, the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*. Nevertheless, by the time of the composition of the *Gauḍapādīya-kārikā* those texts which later became established as fundamental (i.e. the *prasthānatraya*) seem already to have been in existence. A short introduction to the Vedāntic tradition which preceded the formation of the GK then requires some consideration of the philosophical ideas found in these texts and how they might relate to the doctrines and practices propounded in the *Gauḍapādīya-kārikā*.

The Upaniṣadic Heritage of the *Gaudapādīya-kārikā*

Since the term "Vedānta" denotes the final portion of Vedic scripture, that is the *Upaniṣads*, the early history of the Vedānta school is nothing more than the early history of the Upaniṣadic texts themselves.[2] There are roughly four historical layers to the development of the Upaniṣadic ideas, i.e. early, middle, late, and new *Upaniṣads*. It is generally accepted that the earliest stratum contains the *Bṛhadāranyaka* and *Chāndogya Upaniṣads*. These are said to contain material that is pre-Buddhist, placing them at some time before the fifth century (before the Common Era) BCE. The middle period covers such *Upaniṣads* as the *Aitareya*, the *Kauṣītaki*, the *Taittirīya*, the *Kāṭhaka*, the *Muṇḍaka*, the *Praśna*, and the *Śvetāsvatāra Upaniṣads*, which show evidence of Buddhist influences, and must therefore have been compiled after the fifth century BCE.[3] The late *Upaniṣads*, dating from the first two centuries of the Common Era are the *Kena*, the *Īśa*, the *Māṇḍūkya*, and lastly the *Maitrayānīya* (or *Maitri*) *Upaniṣad*.[4] Of the new *Upaniṣads* (which are not usually accepted as valid by the Advaita Vedānta school), nine are pure Vedānta texts, eleven are *yoga upaniṣads*, seven are *saṃnyāsa upaniṣads*, and twelve are sectarian (five *Śaiva* and seven *Vaiṣṇava*).[5] This list is by no means definitive, but the important point for our purposes is the acknowledgment of the fact

that the Vedānta-*darśana* developed out of the speculations of the early, middle, and late *Upaniṣads*.[6]

It is important to note the following wise words from P. T. Raju,

> what is called the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* is not a system of philosophy, but several philosophical doctrines brought together, some of which are even mutually conflicting. For example, the statement "Everything is the Brahman" (*sarvam khalu idam brahma*), is manifestly opposed to the statement, this is not the Brahman (*neti neti*), and a system of philosophy is needed to reconcile the two. The *Upaniṣads* do not belong to the same time or place, neither are they composed by the same authors. . .The *Upaniṣads* do not use the same method, and often their method is not what is strictly called logical. They use in their explanations and demonstrations myths, etymologies, dialogues, etc., which are not really logical proofs.[7]

There is no definitive Upaniṣadic view. The various Upaniṣadic texts do not present a unified religious or philosophical system despite many later attempts to impose a systematic and definitive philosophical position upon them. This makes it particularly difficult to attempt to summarize the immense variety of views and approaches in the short space that is available here. Not only do the *Upaniṣads* contain a plethora of diverse perspectives within them, they are also largely unsystematic compositions, using parables and mythological modes of expression rather than the strict logical forms that we shall encounter when we come to deal with the GK and philosophical Buddhism. This inevitably makes any attempt to summarize or appraise Upaniṣadic thought a difficult one to undertake. Our concern, however, is not to provide a comprehensive examination of Upaniṣadic thought, but rather to consider some of the main speculative trends that run through the Upaniṣadic literature as a whole and that appear to have influenced the distinctive perspective of the *Gauḍapādīya-kārikā*.

An important feature of the Upaniṣadic literature and indeed of post-Vedic religion in general, (that is Brahmanical and non-Brahmanical religion), is the centrality of the doctrine of rebirth (*saṃsāra*) and its corollary, *karman*—action which leads to rebirth. By the time of the composition of the early *Upaniṣads* and the rise of Buddhism around the fifth century BCE, belief in rebirth seems to have become so prevalent as to remain philosophically beyond question in many schools of thought (only movements such as the deterministic *Ājīvīkas*, the materialistic *Cārvakas*, and sceptical agnostics such as Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta seem to have found any fault with the doctrine). Given the resounding silence of the *Saṃhitās* on this belief, one wonders to

what extent belief in rebirth was a religious feature originally found outside the mainstream Vedic religion in the *śramaṇa* communities from which Buddhism and Jainism sprang, only influencing Brahmanical circles during the formative period of Upaniṣadic thought.

Generally speaking, in the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Āraṇyakas* one can see a gradual change in interest from an elaboration of the precise technicalities of the performance of the sacrificial ritual to the meaning and purpose (*artha*) behind the ritual. As time went on, the significance of ritual came to be understood in an increasingly symbolic sense. This attitude is exemplified well by the following passage taken from the beginning of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (I.1.1)

> Truly, the dawn is the head of the sacrificial horse; the sun, his eye; the wind, his breath; the universal fire his open mouth. The year is the body (*ātman*) of the sacrificial horse; the sky his back; the atmosphere his stomach,. . .the stars his bones, the clouds his flesh. . .

The consequence of this re-interpretation of the sacrifice is that the entire creation, subsistence, and destruction of the universe is seen in terms of the primordiality of the sacrificial act. In the *Puruṣasūkta* (*Ṛg Veda* X.90), the universe is said to have been created through the self-dismemberment of the *Puruṣa*. Here in the *Upaniṣads* we find an extension of this style of universalizing the importance of the sacrifice, through symbolic re-interpretations. This is achieved by means of the discovery of great parallels and correspondences (*bandhu*) between the macrocosmic and microcosmic realms of existence.

Eventually, it became clear that the important aspect of the ritual was the mental state of the agent carrying it out. The sacrificer was therefore raised in importance to that of the sacrifice itself. This development led to further speculation in the *Upaniṣads*, with regard to the intrinsic relationship between the individual as sacrificer and the universe as the actualization of the sacrifice itself. In the *Upaniṣads* it became increasingly clear that if the ritual performer was as important as the sacrifice itself, then in a very basic sense he was the sacrifice. This idea clearly links up well with the *Puruṣasūkta*. The sacrifice, therefore, is relevant in some deeply symbolic sense to our understanding of our place in the universe. In this sense, the idea of sacrifice was applicable not just to the performance of the ritual itself but to the agent's entire life.

This attitude led many Upaniṣadic thinkers to dwell upon the question of the nature of the individual self. The term which came to prominence in this context was *ātman*. *Ātman*, the *Upaniṣads* agree,

is the true self of each living being, that which constitutes its real essence. But what was the precise nature of this essence?

The notion of a transmigrating agent (*saṃsārin*) emphasized the fact that the true self (*ātman*) of a person was not just the person embodied in the present lifetime. The self has experienced a myriad of different existences in different bodies and in different circumstances. This reincarnating self constitutes the permanent essence, the intrinsic nature of each individual. As such our bodies are merely vehicles or chariots,[8] and it is only through ignorance that the individual continues to spend his or her life wrongly associating their true self (*ātman*) with the ephemeral embodied self (*śarīrātman*).[9]

Salvation is thus achieved not so much through the external performance of the ritual as through its internal performance through the practice of certain forms of asceticism or "self-sacrifice." Such activities lead the individual away from the slavery of following the passions and desires of his transient human lifetime and would eventually precipitate an intuitive realization of one's true nature as *ātman*, the permanent self that lies behind the many lives experienced during the cycle of rebirths.

Here we have a clear change of emphasis in relation to the earlier Vedic cult of the sacrifice. It is not action (*karman*) which leads to salvation. Action leads to a corresponding re-action in this world. In the *Upaniṣads* this is not usually seen as a desirable consequence. The goal is the attainment of knowledge, a mystical gnosis of one's true self, the permanent essence of conscious existence—beyond the incessant round of rebirths. It is in the *Upaniṣads*, then, that we find the establishment of a new spiritual goal, that of *mokṣa*—liberation or salvation from rebirth. Salvation no longer consisted in being established in a heavenly realm somewhat similar to life on earth, but in an awareness that one's own true nature is beyond the fluctuations of rebirth. Liberation (*mokṣa*) is the realization of Truth (*satya*), truth being that which is (*sat*), was and forever will be. This reflects the cosmogonic interest of the Vedānta scriptures. Reality is that which always is, i.e. that which exists before, during, and after the created realm of names and forms (*nāma-rūpa*).

Thus, it is soon established in the *Upaniṣads* that there were two "states of being" or "modes of existence"—*saṃsāra*, "the common flowing," that is the endless cycle of rebirths, and *mokṣa*, liberation from that cycle. This is sometimes expressed in the idea that the fate of the deceased can follow two distinct paths, the path of the gods (*devayāna*) or the path of the ancestors (*pitṛyāna*). It is the latter which eventually leads to a future rebirth (ie. continued participation in *saṃsāra*).[10]

Cosmogonic Speculation in the Upaniṣads

> How many gods are there Yājñavalkya? . . .Three hundred and three and three thousand and three. . .Thirty-three. . .Six. . .Three. . .Two. . .One and a half. . .One.[11]

The *Upaniṣads* develop their ideas from the speculations of some Vedic hymns concerning the nature of the creation of the universe. Certain hymns display an implicit monism in the sense that they envisage the creation of the multiplicity as a derivative of a pre-existent unity. The Upaniṣadic thinkers were interested in establishing what truly and fundamentally exists. This involved answering such questions as "where did the universe come from?" and "what is it made up of?" The most important question, however, concerned the nature of ultimate reality: "what is it that exists both before the creation and after the dissolution of the universe?" In hymns such as the *Puruṣa-Sūkta* (*Ṛg Veda* X.90) there is a pre-figuring of a number of important Upaniṣadic themes and this in itself is not surprising for the *Upaniṣads* are largely an outgrowth of the same Brahmanical world-view. It also seems fair to note that insofar as the *Puruṣa-Sūkta* is a relatively late hymn of the *Ṛg Veda*, it is more likely to be closer to the age of the *Upaniṣads* than other (earlier) parts of the *Saṃhitā* corpus of hymns.

Interest in the pre-cosmic state is evident throughout the Upaniṣadic texts and included a variety of speculations, often within the same *Upaniṣad*. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, for instance, outlines a variety of cosmogonies. In III.19 the creation of the universe is said to arise from non-being in the form of a cosmic egg. However, later in the same text (VI.1–2) one finds the following,

> "In the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being (*sat*), one only, without a second. To be sure, some people say: 'In the beginning this world was just Non-being (*a-sat*), one only, without a second; from that Non-being Being was produced.' But verily, my dear, whence could this be?" said he. "How from Non-being could Being be produced?"[12]

In *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II.6 , the primeval being desires to be many and procreates via the practice of austerities (*tapas*).

> Having performed austerity he created this whole world, whatever there is here. Having created it, into it, indeed, he entered. Having entered it, he became both the actual (*sat*) and the yon (*tya*), both the defined (*nirukta*) and the undefined, both the based and the non-based, both the conscious (*vijñāna*) and the unconscious, both the real (*satya*) and

> the false (*anṛta*). As the real, he became whatever there is here. That is what they call the real.[13]

Similar themes can be found in *Aitareya Upaniṣad* I.1, *Praśna Upaniṣad* I.3, and 4 etc. The strong Upaniṣadic interest in cosmogony lead to further speculation about the nature of the fundamental support (*ādhāra*) of the universe. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (III.6), the sage Yājñavalkya is asked by Gārgī, the daughter of Vacaknu, a series of penetrating questions concerning the fundamental substratum of the universe. After a long list of questions and answers Yājñavalkya retorts,

> "Do not, O Gārgī, push your inquiry too far, lest your head should fall off. You are questioning about a deity that should not be reasoned about."[14]

Yājñavalkya, however, is not always so reticent in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. In BU V.1 Brahman is said to be the plenitude (*pūrṇakta*) which remains full even when emptied. Throughout the *Upaniṣads* there are frequent statements which characterize Brahman as the underlying essence of all things:

> Verily, this whole world is Brahma. Tranquil, let one worship It as that from which he came forth, as that into which he will be dissolved, as that into which he breathes. . . .Containing all works, containing all desires, containing all tastes, encompassing this whole world, the unspeaking, the unconcerned—this is the Soul of mine within the heart, this is Brahma. Into him I shall enter on departing hence.[15]

Indeed, one of the great sayings (*mahā-vākya*) of the Vedānta, appearing in a number of *upaniṣads*, states that,

> "That which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is *Ātman* (Soul). That art thou, Śvetaketu."[16]

At other times, however, it is the term "*brahman*" and not "*ātman*" which is emphasized as the source of all. The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* for instance begins with the declaration that Brahman is the creator of the entire universe (*kartāviśvasya*), and the protector of the world (*goptābhuvanasya*). (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* I.i.1) Brahman's status as universal source is again reiterated in II.i.1:

> As from a fire, fully ablaze, fly off sparks, in their thousands, that are akin to the fire, similarly O good-looking one, from the Immutable (*akṣara*) originate different kinds of creatures and into It again they merge.

The ambiguity of some of these statements reflects the fact that the *Upaniṣads* do not have a definitive point of view, even within the same *Upaniṣad*. GK III.23 notes for instance that the *śruti* equally upholds the view that creation occurs from a pre-existent being (*sat*) and that it proceeds from non-existence. Creation is most frequently understood to be a transformation (*pariṇāma*) or an emanation from a pre-existent reality. Creation from non-being (*asat*), however, is put forward as a possibility in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* III.19 and *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II.7. This is not necessarily a *creatio ex nihilo*, but in all likelihood denotes an emergence of being from the pregnant and undifferentiated chaos known as non-being (*asat*). Nevertheless, the equating of non-being with nothingness may have been intended and it is certainly criticized on those grounds in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.2. The predominant Brahmanical creation theme, however, describes an emanation from or transformation of "*sat*," whether envisaged as an abstract impersonal reality as in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II.i, or from a personal creator, as in *Praśna Upaniṣad* I.4. Here we can see the roots of the later philosophical theory of *satkāryavāda*—the doctrine that the effect (in this case the universe) is a modification (*pariṇāma::vikāra*) of the pre-existent cause (Brahman).

Brahman is the ground and support of the entire universe. The overwhelming trend in the *Upaniṣads* suggests that Brahman is not a personal god of some sort; rather it is impersonal (or perhaps supra-personal) and essentially beyond description. Brahman is basically the source of everything, including the gods themselves. It is the conscious and intelligent principle which created the universe *in illo tempore*. Thus we find the *Upaniṣads* frequently stating that: "Truly, in the beginning this universe was Brahman, one alone by itself."

Psychology in the Upaniṣads

One consequence of the doctrines of *karman* and *saṃsāra* or rebirth was the fact that personal destiny was now firmly placed in the hands of the individual. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* states that:

> According to how one acts, according to how one conducts oneself, so does one become. The doer of good becomes good, the doer of evil becomes evil . . .[17]

However, the text continues:

> . . . But, it is said that 'a person is made [not by his acts but] by his desires alone.' As is his desire so is his resolve, as is his resolve, such is the action (*karman*) that he performs.

Since it is our desires (*kāma*) which motivate our actions, it is the underlying desire and not the act itself which is the root cause of birth and its perpetuation in *saṃsāra*. The source of our continued sorrow (*duḥkha*), the perpetuation of the lifecycle, is our desire (*kāma*) for sense-objects and pleasures. This is the beginnings of the ethicizing of the concept of *karman*, that is its transformation from an external theory of causation to an intrinsic moral theory based upon the motives behind our actions.[18]

These features are aptly displayed in the *Katha Upanisad* in the story of Naciketas, the son of a Brahmin priest.[19] In a moment of rage Naciketas is sent to Death (Yama) as a sacrifice by his father. However, upon his arrival there is no attendant to greet him. Three days elapse before Yama, the god of the dead finds Naciketas alone (Yama in fact, in Vedic mythology was the first man to die. He it is therefore who prepares the rest of mankind upon their death). Yama is dismayed for "this is no way to treat a Brahmin!," and so offers Naciketas three boons. The first is for Naciketas to return to his now remorseful father, and Yama agrees that this should be granted. Second, Naciketas requests to know the secret meaning of the sacrificial fire (*agni*) and how it ascends to the heavens. This is also granted by Yama. Third, Naciketas asks to know if there is an after-life, and if so, the path to immortality. Yama is reluctant to impart this information, saying that it is extremely profound and that even the gods do not know of its precise nature. Instead he offers riches and kingdoms beyond compare. But Naciketas is undeterred—these are ephemeral, he says, they do not lead to lasting salvation; they are but temporary distractions. Finally, Yama relents and tells Naciketas the path to the "deathless state" (*amṛta*).[20]

In many ways, in fact, Naciketas already knows the answer Yama is to give him since he has already declared that the pleasures of the world are inadequate and superficial. Liberation from the repeated cycle of birth and death is to be attained through the restraint of our faculties. This is to be achieved by the practice of *yoga*. Thence follows the analogy of the chariot, in which the following comparisons are made:

> Know the (individual) Self (*ātman*) as the master of the chariot, and the body (*śarīra*) as the chariot. Know the intellect (*buddhi*) as the charioteer, and the mind (*manas*) as verily the bridle.
>
> They call the senses (*indriya*) the horses; the senses having been imagined as horses, (know) the objects (*visaya*) as the ways. The discriminating people (*manīṣiṇa*) call that Self the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*), when it is associated with the body, senses, and mind.[21]

Thus, the body is likened to a chariot, and the mind to the reins of that chariot. *Ātman*, our true self, is the lord of the chariot, that is the person traveling within it. Liberation is achieved by controlling the mind-body complex (here said to be made up of the material body, the sense-organs, the intellect, and the mind,) and the realization that the true essence of existence is not this ephemeral complex, but rather the *ātman* which travels within it. Rather than roaming around searching for ephemeral satisfactions like a chariot without a master controlling its reins, one should endeavor to control the "vehicle" of one's experiences. Likewise, just as a person travels in various chariots at different times, so does the *ātman* transmigrate from body to body. The goal then is to gain control of our saṃsāric vehicles through the yogic control of the senses. One should endeavor to realize one's status as "Lord of the chariot" (*rathin*).

The belief that one should restrain all misguided hedonistic tendencies probably reflects external influence upon Upaniṣadic thought from the communities of wandering ascetics (*śramaṇa*) from which the heterodox movements of Buddhism and Jainism first sprang. Buddhist influence on the middle and late *Upaniṣads* is beyond reasonable dispute. The focus of the earliest (pre-Buddhist) *Upaniṣads*, however, had also been on the intuitive apprehension of *ātman*, the innermost essence of all living beings. These texts thus represent a tradition aiming at an intuitive knowledge of the innermost nature of all sentient beings—the very source of conscious existence. In this respect the primacy of the *Upaniṣads* in post-Vedic "orthodoxy" reflects the establishment of a religious movement within mainstream Brahmanism which emphasizes the importance of gnosis (*vidyā*) for the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*). In classical times this aspect contributed to the separation (at least intellectually) between the path of ritual action (*karma-mārga*) and the path of knowledge (*jñāna-mārga*), the respective emphases of the (Pūrva)-Karma-Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta (Uttara-Mīmāṃsā) schools. An early example of the supreme importance attached to the discovery of the indwelling (*antaryāmin*) self (*ātman*) can be seen from Yājñavalkya's final teaching to his wife Maitreyī in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II.4. Here Yājñavalkya declares that everything that is valued is so treasured not because of itself but because of the *ātman* within. This establishes the enquiry into the interior nature of the self as the most important to undertake.[22]

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* the individual self is analyzed in terms of the sense-faculties fighting for supremacy. The greatest of these faculties is *prāṇa*—the life-force, the breath which sustains all conscious existence.[23] This is polytheism in a psychological context—

the individual like the rest of the universe is made up of a number of conflicting powers or *devas*. Indeed in some instances the term "*deva*" is used to denote the sense-faculties.[24] Nevertheless, the competition between the senses ends upon sleep when there is a unity (*ekadhā*) of the various faculties.[25]

Just as cosmogonically speaking the one Brahman becomes the many in creation, and the return to oneness at universal dissolution, the one *prāṇa*, identified with the animating consciousness-self (*prajñātman*), divides itself up into the various bodily faculties during the day and becomes one at the end of the day. These correspond on a cosmogonic level to what have been called "the day and night of Brahmā." Taking this correspondence to the extreme, one might suggest that the individual creates the world of his experience (*dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda*) just as Brahman creates the universe. Nevertheless, this step is not taken by the *Upaniṣads*, nor is it made by classical Advaita Vedānta.[26] All Advaitins, however, acknowledge that a significant aspect of an individual's experience (or at least the form in which it is experienced) is the product of that individual's own activity. This, however, is little more than a re-statement of the centrality of the *karman* doctrine.[27] Advaita Vedānta, in common with virtually the entirety of Indian philosophical speculation, tended to accept the *karman* doctrine as axiomatic.

The Four States of Experience

There are three "normative" states of consciousness—waking, dream, and deep sleep. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* Yājñavalkya is asked by King Janaka "what is the light of man?" After a series of answers and further questions establishing a progressive dialectic, the final irreducible source of light is said to be the *ātman*.[28] This is reminiscent of certain Indian theories of perception where the inner organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) proceeds outward and illuminates the dark insentient world (like beams of light emitted from the eyes). Here the point of the discussion is that sentient experience is impossible without the *ātman* as the conscious support of experience. This allows Yājñavalkya to draw a distinction between dream and waking experiences. In waking experience one is dependent upon the natural light of the sun as well as the inner (consciousness-giving) light of the *ātman*, while in dreams one only requires the self-illuminating light of the *ātman*.[29] The dream state, however, is an intermediatory place existing at the boundary between this world and another (*paraloka*). In dreams, the person has the freedom and creativity to construct his

own world based upon his insight into the waking world and the world beyond. As a free agent (*kartr*), the person constructs chariots, roads etc. experiencing great joy and sadness. This state does not last, however, and the agent is said to be like a fish forever swimming between the two shores of waking and dream states.[30] Finally the weary traveler reaches the end of his sojourn in a state beyond desire or fear. Here the self resides in blissful rest (*samprasāda*) where there are absolutely no distinctions. The text is not without ambiguity on this issue, but it would seem that at this stage no explicit distinction has yet been made between the blissful non-distinction of deep sleep and the insightful non-dual awareness of a fourth state of experience.

Nevertheless, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* we find a hierarchy of experience which is something of a reversal of the common-sensical attitude. Dreams provide a greater degree of insight into the nature of the self when compared to waking experience since in the former only the inner light of the self is involved. Moreover, in deep sleep even the fantasies and mental fabrications of dreams cease (if only temporarily) and one experiences a blissful state of quiescence (*samprasāda*) beyond all desires, fears, and distinctions. The unmediated awareness of the *ātman* then is closest to the experience of deep sleep since it is here that one may find a clearer apprehension of the self, devoid of all external and internal distraction.[31] Thus Yājñavalkya declares

> As a lump of salt is without interior or exterior, entire, and purely saline in taste, even so is the Self without interior or exterior, entire, and Pure Intelligence (*prajñāna*) alone. The (self) comes out (as a separate entity) from these elements, and (this separateness) is destroyed with them. After attaining (this oneness) it has no more (particular) consciousness (*saṃjñā*).[32]

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* sleep is more clearly distinguished from the attainment of mystical knowledge of the *ātman*. This much is clear from the teaching Prajāpati gives to Indra in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII.7-12. Sleep in fact is not a state of bliss, Indra suggests, but an annihilation of consciousness.[33] Prajāpati thus teaches Indra that the true self is beyond the state of the embodied, the dream, and the serenity of deep sleep. The body is merely the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the supreme person (*uttamapuruṣa*) which in fact is neither embodied nor touched by pleasure and pain.[34] Having risen beyond bodily form and ascended toward the highest light (*paraṃ jyotir*), "one goes around laughing, sporting, having enjoyment with women, or friends, not remembering the appendage of this body."[35]

In the *Gauḍapādīya-kārikā* waking and dream experience are conflated. Sleep is temporary and, following Indra in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, is said to lack any awareness whatsoever. As such it is a non-apprehension of reality (*tattva-agrahaṇa*).[36] The explanation of the similarity of the waking and dream states in GK II, however, is dependent upon the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* analysis. Both states are dependent upon the light of the indwelling *ātman*.[37] In fact the GK's view that both states are non-veridical is based upon the fact that they are impermanent and sublated by each other. This is the point made in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV.iii.18 with the analogy of the fish swimming between the two shores. Thus, the emphasis in the GK is placed upon the fourth state (*turīya*), which is a permanent insight into reality (unlike the absence of awareness in deep sleep), but without the distractions of an inner world (as in dream and waking experience) and an outer world (as in the waking state, but also implicitly in the dream state).[38]

The conjunction of cosmological and psychological speculation in the *Upaniṣads* was achieved by way of the *bandhutā* homology,[39] that is the scheme whereby great correspondences and parallels were envisaged between different realms of existence. The complementarity between the cosmic and the individual can be illustrated if we consider the Vedic notion of desire (*kāma*). As we have seen, the Upaniṣadic acceptance of the doctrines of *karman* and rebirth (*saṃsāra*) and the early recognition that the karmic power of an action lay in the intention or desire motivating it rather than in the act itself stressed the importance of desire in the perpetuation of rebirth.[40] There are a number of instances in the *Saṃhitās*, however, where desire (*kāma*) is specifically associated with the creation of the universe.[41] What the intentional view of *karman* suggests is that just as the *kāma* of the divine being creates the macrocosm, the *kāma* of the individual self perpetuates rebirth and thus in one sense creates the microcosmic universe of personal experience. In the *Upaniṣads* the macrocosmic and the microcosmic are identified. Brahman is the mysterious support of everything, the universal and transcendent substratum.[42] This Brahman is *Ātman* the (immanent) inner-controller (*antaryāmin*) of all things.[43]

In terms of the Upanisadic sources which influenced the rise of Advaita Vedānta we should note that the *Upaniṣads* were already moving in the direction of postulating an eternal and unchanging essence to man. This was *ātman*, the self that existed through a succession of lives. Speculation from the cosmological angle had also established that there was a basic underlying principle which supported

the entire universe, i.e. Brahman, the totality of existence, pure Being itself. This two-pronged investigation of ultimate reality, the one interested in finding an underlying cosmic principle supporting the universe, and the other searching for the underlying essence of the individual person culminated in their eventual identification:

> *ātman* as the innermost essence or soul of man, and
> Brahman as the innermost essence and support of the universe.

The goal of the *Upaniṣads* then can be seen in terms of a return to one's origins, a realization that the individual self and the universe are created, supported, controlled, and thoroughly pervaded by Brahman, the mysterious source of everything. "That One" (*tad ekam*) is what all created things emerged from, and "That One" is what they shall return to. Brahman is the source of the universe as well as its inner controller (*antaryāmin*). Thus we can see in the *Upaniṣads* a tendency towards a convergence of microcosm and macrocosm, culminating in the equating of *ātman* with Brahman. The scheme of hidden correspondences already firmly established in the pre-Upaniṣadic literature and the monistic speculations of some of the Vedic *Saṃhitās* contributed to an investigative attitude and an interest in fundamental principles. The prevailing monism of the *Upaniṣads* was developed by the Advaita Vedānta to its ultimate extreme. This is not to suggest that the Upaniṣadic texts support the Advaita point of view, nor is it to deny that there are verses and statements which are amenable to such an interpretation. There is no systematic philosophy expounded in the *Upaniṣads*; rather these texts represent a number of speculative trends intertwined and interspersed with one another. The various schools of Vedānta philosophy which subsequently developed in response to the unsystematic nature of Upaniṣadic monism reflect the cryptic nature of the Upaniṣadic texts. The rich complexity of the Upaniṣadic source material made such texts amenable to a variety of sophisticated interpretations and philosophical accretions. Indeed our own analysis has highlighted the difficulty in making any general statement about the *Upaniṣads* without running the risk of misrepresentation and over-systematization.

Like the *Upaniṣads*, the GK approaches similar issues from two basic directions. Throughout the text we find a psychological analysis of states of consciousness, culminating in a non-dualistic (*advaya*) theory of perception (the theoretical basis for the practice of *asparśayoga*). In addition to this the GK also provides an ontological analysis of the nature of cosmogonic theories, culminating in the

doctrines of non-origination (*ajātivāda*) and non-dualism (*advaita*). The Upaniṣadic texts to which the GK seems most indebted are the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. We have briefly considered the former. Given the connection of GK I with the latter it would seem appropriate to consider the MU also.

The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad

The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* provides the focus for the exposition of Vedāntic philosophy in the first *prakaraṇa* of the GK. The text is important for its concise development of various Upaniṣadic themes, notably the symbolism and meditation upon the syllable Om and the doctrine of the four states of experience (*catuṣpād*). The text is short and is given below in full:[44]

1. This syllable Om is all this. Its further explanation is: All that was, is, and shall be is merely the syllable OM. Whatever else there is, beyond the three periods of time, that too is only OM.

2. Indeed, all this is Brahman; The self (*Ātman*) is Brahman. This same self has four quarters.

3. The first quarter is *Vaiśvānara*, conscious of an external [world], in the waking state, having seven limbs and nineteen mouths; [it is] the enjoyer of gross objects.

4. The second quarter is *Taijasa*—The Radiant, conscious of an internal [world], in the dream state, having seven limbs and nineteen mouths; [it is] the enjoyer of subtle objects.

5. When sleeping, "one desires no pleasure whatsoever and sees no dream,"[45] that is deep sleep. The third quarter is *Prājña*, just a unified mass of cognition, consisting of bliss, in the state of deep sleep; indeed, [it is] the enjoyer of bliss and the aperture of cognition.

6. This is the Lord of all; this is the knower of all, the inner controller. This is the womb of all, for it is the beginning and end of beings.

7. Not conscious of an "internal," not conscious of an "external," not conscious of both [together], not a mass of cognition, neither cognitive nor non-cognitive, unseen, unrelated, incomprehensible, indefinable, unthinkable,

74. See Ruegg (1981), *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, p. 87.

75. See Wood, ibid., pp. 140f.

76. Even Sadānanda in his fifteenth century text the *Vedāntasāra* quotes verses 45 and 46 from the third *prakaraṇa*, again omitting any mention of MK IV.

77. Whether the *Gauḍapādīyakārikābhāṣya* is by Śaṅkara is an important issue, but one to which we do not have time to do justice. The text, even if not by Śaṅkara himself shows a naivety with regard to Buddhism and a lack of awareness of post-Śaṅkarite ideas, which suggest that it is also an early (i.e. pre-Śaṅkarite) text of the school. If it is by Śaṅkara (and many respected and able scholars suggest that it is, see for instance Mayeda (1967–68), Hacker (1972) and Vetter (1978)), then it is likely to be an early commentary—not showing the intellectual maturity of the BSBh. For a discussion of the authenticity of the commentary see Paul Hacker "Notes on the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* and Śaṅkara's *Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa*," and Sengaku Mayeda, "On the Author of the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* and the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*," in *Adyar Library Bulletin* 31–32, (1967–68), pp. 73–94.

Chapter 2 The Vedānta Heritage of the *Gauḍapādīya-kārikā*

1. The concept of non-human revelation was a doctrine of the Karma-mīmāṃsa school, adopted by its "sister school" the Vedānta.

2. Early names for the Vedānta school were "Upaniṣadic ones" (*upaniṣada*) "the doctrine of the end of the Vedas" (*Vedānta-vāda*), "the doctrine of Brahman" (*brahma-vāda*), "the doctrine that Brahman is the cause of everything]" (*brahma-kāraṇa-vāda*). Śaṅkara has various names for his own school: "the doctrine of non-dualism" (*advaita-vāda*), "the school of non-difference" (*abheda-darśana*), "the doctrine of the denial of dualism" (*dvaitavādapratiṣedha*), and "Non-dualism of the Isolated" (*kevalādvaita*). The term *advaita* first occurs in a recognizably Vedāntic context in the prose of *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* 7, although it is to a certain extent prefigured in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*'s statement that Brahman is "one without a second" (*ekam advitiyam*).

3. There is also the *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, a composite text constituting part of the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*.

4. For a more sophisticated chronology see Nakamura (1983), *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*, Vol 1, p. 42.

5. See Deussen (1906), *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 9–10. For an alternative historical analysis see Nakamura, ibid., p. 44.

6. The distinction between Pūrva-Mīmāmsa and Uttara-Mīmāmsa corresponds in Brahmanical circles to the sections of the Vedas dealing with ritual action and injunction (*karma-kāṇḍa* or *vidhi-kāṇḍa*) and knowledge (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*).

7. P. T. Raju (1985), *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*, (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi), p. 25.

8. See *Katha Upaniṣad* I.iii.3–9, and following discussion.

9. This is an idea taken up by Śaṅkara in his notion of *adhyāsa*. The discrimination (*viveka*) of the self from what is not-self is also an important feature of the Sāmkhya philosophy.

10. See for instance *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad* I.2–3.

11. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* III.9.

12. Translation in Hume (1931), p. 241.

13. *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* II.6; see also II.7; Hume trans., p. 287.

14. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* III. vi; trans. Madhavananda, p. 342–343.

15. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* III.14.1,4.

16. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.12ff; cf also *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* I.8: "Om is Brahman. Om is all this," *Aitareya* III.1.3; *Īsa Upaniṣad* 5; *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* II.2.11.36. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* IV.4.5, 6.

17. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* III.2.13.

18. It has been argued by some scholars (e.g. Richard Gombrich (1988)), *Theravāda Buddhism* (Routledge, p. 66) that it is the Buddha who is primarily responsible for "ethicizing" of the concepts of *karman* (action) and *saṃsāra* (rebirth), to denote the intention or volition (*cetanā*) being actions and not the actions themselves. While this is a clear feature of the Buddha's teachings, the verse quoted from the *Bṛhadāranayaka Upaniṣad* suggests that the move pre-dates Śakyamuni. It would also be unwise to assume that the mental state of the agent performing a sacrifice was of no relevance in pre-*Bṛhadāranyaka* Vedic passages.

19. *Kāṭha Upaniṣad* I.i.1–II.iii. 19.

20. *Kāṭha Upaniṣad* I.iii. 3–4.

21. See also *Kāṭha Upaniṣad* IV.1–2.

22. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* VI.1.

23. See *Kauṣītakī* I.6, III.3, IV.20; *Kāṭha* II. ii.3; Isa 4; *Muṇḍaka* III.1.8, III.2.7; *Praśna* V.11.

24. *Kausītakī* IV.19, 20.

25. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* IV.iv.

26. The doctrine that the world is a creation of individual experience is also not a position endorsed by the *Gauḍapādīya-kārikā*, see for instance GK I.18, or by any of the major exponents of Advaita philosophy until perhaps Prakāśānanda in the sixteenth century.

27. So in fact, while it may be true that in an ultimate sense *karman* is, in Eliot Deutsch's words, "a convenient fiction" for the Advaita Vedāntin, the doctrine provides an explanation of an individual's (*jīva*) faulty apprehension of reality. As such, Deutsch suggess that *karman* is "a theory that is undemonstrable but useful in interpreting experience." See Eliot Deutsch (1969), *Advaita Vedānta: a Philosophical Reconstruction*, East-West Center Press, Honolulu, (1969), p. 69.

28. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* IV.iii.6.

29. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* IV.iii.14.

30. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* IV.iii.18.

31. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* IV.iii.21–32.

32. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* IV.v.13. Translation by Madhvānanda, p. 542.

33. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII.11.1.

34. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII.12.1.

35. *Chānodgya Upaniṣad* VIII.12.1; translation by Hume, p. 272.

36. GK I.15. See also GK III.34–36.

37. GK II.3 specifically refers to *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* IV.iii. Linda Kay Barabas Mackey (1983), *Reflections on Advaita Vedānta: The Approach of the GaudapādaKārikā on the Māndūkyopaniṣad with Śaṅkara's Commentary* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Texas at Austin), p. 28f., argues that GK II.3cd (*vaitathyaṃ tena vai prāptaṃ svapna āhuḥ prakāśitam*) is deliberately ambiguous in that it can be understood to mean "the established illusoriness has been shown in dream" or "the illusion being thus established, they declare the light in dream." She suggests that the second is the primary meaning (p. 29). Thus, "An examination of the dream state can clarify our understanding of the nature of the light of experience because in this state the light is not confused with the activities of the senses and the external lights. . .The third verse of the *kārikā* refers to this part of the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* because here it is shown that the internal light of the dreamer must necessarily be self-luminous since there is no other light by which the dream is seen." (pp. 59–60).

38. See GK II.9.

39. This term is used by Andrew Fort (1989), *The Self and Its States*. See p. 16 *et passim*.

40. See *Brhadāranyaka Upanisad* IV.iv.5.

41. *Kāma* is used in this cosmogonic sense in *Rg Veda* X.129; X.190.

42. *Brhadāranyaka Upanisad* III.vi.

43. *Brhadāranyaka Upanisad* III.vii.

44. The text of the *Māndūkya Upanisad* is as follows:

1. *aum ity etad aksaram idam sarvam tasyopavyākhyānam bhūtam bhavad bhavisyad iti sarvam aumkāra eva yac cānyat trikālātītam tad apy aumkāra eva.*
2. *sarvam hy etad brahma ayam ātmā brahma so'yam ātmā catuspāt.*
3. *jāgarita sthāno bahisprajñah saptānga ekonavimsati mukhah sthūla bhug vaisvānarah prathamah pādah.*
4. *svapna sthāno 'ntah prajñah saptānga ekonavimsati mukhah pravivikta bhuk taijaso dvitīyah pādah.*
5. *yatra supto na kamcana kāmam kāmayate na kamcana svapnam pasyati tat susuptam susupta sthāna ekībhūtah prajñānaghana evānanda mayo hy ānanda bhuk ceto mukhah prājñas trtīyah pādah.*
6. *esa sarvesvarah esa sarvajñah eso 'ntaryāmi esa yonih sarvasya prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām.*
7. *nāntah prajñam na bahis prajñam nobhayatah prajñam na prajñāna ghanam na prajñam naprajñam adrstam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alaksanam acintyam avyapadesyam ekātma pratyaya sāram prapañcopasamam sāntam sivam advaitam caturtham manyante sātmā sa vijñeyah.*
8. *so 'yam ātmādhyaksaram aumkāro 'dhimātram pādā mātrā mātrās ca pādā akāra makāra iti.*
9. *jāgarita sthāno vaisvānaro 'kārah prathāmā mātrā'pter ādimattvād vā'pnoti ha vai sarvān kāmān ādis ca bhavati ya evam veda.*
10. *svapna sthānas taijasa ukāro dvitīyā mātrotkarsat ubhayatvādvotkarsati ha vai jñāna samtatim samānas ca bhavati nāsyābrahmavit kule bhavati ya evam veda.*
11. *susupta sthānah prājño makāras trtīyā mātrā miter apīter vā minoti ha vā idam sarvam apītis ca bhavati ya evam veda.*
12. *amātras caturtho 'vyavahāryah prapañcopasamah sivo'dvaita evam aumkāra ātmaiva samvisaty ātmanā'tmanam ya evam veda.*

45. This phrase is borrowed from *Brhadāranyaka Upanisad* IV.iii.19.

46. MU 3; see also GK I.3,4.

47. See *Brhadāranyaka Upanisad* IV.iii.9.

48. Wood, ibid., p. 59.

49. Wood, ibid., pp. 11–12.

50. See Wood, ibid., pp. 54–56.

51. The interest of the author of GK I in meditation upon Om may reflect practical orientation and interest in the practice of yoga. This interest cannot found in the mature works of Śaṅkara, who perhaps not surprisingly does t place as much emphasis upon the practice of yoga. See Andrew Fort (1989), *e Self and its States*, p. 344: "it seems that Śaṅkara sees om analysis as condary, necessary only for the weaker devotees, those who need a support know brahman." See also chapter 5 of this work.

52. Raghunath Damadar Karmarkar (1953), *The Gaudapāda-kārikā* (Govt. iental Series – Class B, No. 9, Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute).

53. See Sangamlal Pandey (1974) *Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Philosophy*.

54. e.g. *Chāndogya Upanisad* III.14; *Katha Upanisad* II.iii.17; *Svetāsvatāra panisad* 3.20, 4.17.

55. *Katha Upanisad* I.2.22; II.1.4, and II.3.6.

56. See especially BG VIII.6, but also BG IV.11; VII.21–23; IX.16–25; X.2 id X.20–39.

57. Cf. BG VII.24, which says that the higher state is changeless (*avyaya*). e also XIII.31. *Bhagavadgītā* discusses the unchanging and static nature of rahman in XIII.12–17.

58. e.g. see BG VIII.22; IX.27.

59. BG VII.5; VIII.20; XV.16–17.

60. Translation by R. C. Zaehner (1969), *The Bhagavad Gītā* (Oxford niversity Press). Compare this reference to Brahman as the womb with *rahmasūtra* 1.1.2.

61. *Brahmasūtrabhāsya* I.3.30 and II.1.37.

62. *Upadeśasāhasrī* I.16; 67.

63. Sangamlal Pandey (1974), *Pre-Samkara Advaita Philosophy,* p. 127.

64. BS I.2.28; I.2.31; I.3.31; I.4.18; III.2.40; III.4.2; III.4.18; III.4.40; V.3.12; IV.4.5; and IV.4.11. See Nakamura (1983), *Early Vedānta Philosophy*, Vol I, p. 401.

65. Nakamura, ibid., p. 407.

66. Ibid., p. 423.

67. Ibid., p. 433.

68. Ibid., p. 432 and p. 436.

69. Both Rāmānuja and Nimbārka consider the "*atha*" (now) to refer to the fact that knowledge of Brahman comes "after the knowledge of *karman* and its fruits." Śaṅkara considers the term to be referring back to the four pre-requisites for knowledge of Brahman, i.e. discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, aversion to the enjoyment of sense-objects, the attainment of self-restraint and tranquility, and the desire for liberation. Madhva is not specific as to the reason for the occurrence of the term, while Vallabha takes "*atha*" in the sense of "*adhikāra*," that is as the beginning of a new topic requiring no pre-requisities. See V. S. Ghate, *The Vedānta: A study of the Brahmasūtras with the bhāsyas of Samkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva and Vallabha*, (3rd edition, 1981, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, poona), p. 55.

70. See Nakamura, ibid., p. 415.

71. Ibid., p. 520.

72. Ibid., p. 484.

73. The term "*brahman*" originally denoted the *mantra*, the sacred Vedic utterance. As a result it was soon conflated with the revelatory word of the Vedas themselves (*śabda*). This early connotation is also present in two subsequent developments—first in the equation of Brahman with the syllable Om, found throughout the Upaniṣadic literature, (but see in particular the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and *Gauḍapādīya-kārikā* I), and second in Bhartṛhari's notion of *śabda-brahman*—the Absolute as Sound.

74. Cf. GK I.9.

75. Maṇḍana-Miśra deals thoroughly with the issue of Brahman as "bliss" (*ānanda*) in his *Brahma Siddhi*.

76. Nakamura, ibid., p. 472.

77. Ibid., p. 473.

78. For example, the usage of the term "*puruṣa*" to denote the self, the adoption of the theory of *triguṇa*, etc. See Nakamura, ibid., p. 146 and p. 154.

79. This in itself seems to derive from *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad* 4.19.

80. Nakamura, ibid., *passim*.

81. For example, the debate between the Parmenidean and Heraclitean points of view in pre-Socratic Greece, and later the debate between Cratylus

and Plato in *Cratylus*. The classic alternatives in this debate in an Indian context can be seen in the respective positions of Nāgārjuna and Gaudapāda, see my "*Śūnyatā* and *Ajāti*: Absolutism and the Philosophies of Nāgārjuna and Gaudapāda" in *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 17. No. 4 (1989): pp. 396ff., and chapter 4 of this monograph. In a more contemporary, Western setting this problem was tackled from the point of view of the absolutist by the English philosopher Francis Herbert Bradley (see Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1893, p. 40f).

82. Nakamura, ibid., pp. 495–496.

83. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* III.ii.3, translation by Gambhirānanda, p. 590.

84. For example see *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* I.iv.23–27.

85. GK II.4.

86. For a concise discussion of *bhedābheda-vāda* see Madan Mohan Agrawal, "The Origin and Development of the Doctrine of Difference and Non-difference," in *Aspects of Indian Philosophy* (1986, Shree Publishing House, New Delhi, India), chapter 1, pp. 1–23.

87. Śaṅkara uses the term *vivartate* in BSBh 1.3.39, 2.2.1 (disputed reading), and *Taittiriya Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* 1.6.2. The term *vivarta* is never found in any clearly authenticated works of Śaṅkara.

88. See *Brahma Siddhi* 7.23–8.10; 18 1–3; 19.1–4; *Vibhramaviveka* 36. See also Thrasher's "*Vivarta* According to Maṇḍana-Miśra" in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasien*. Maṇḍana seems to get the term "*vivarta*" from Bhartṛhari.

89. *Vākyapadīya* 3.7, 105, p. 246.

90. Cf. *Yoga Sūtra* I.3: liberation is the *Puruṣa* abiding in its own-form (*svarūpa*).

91. This idea is prefigured in the *Upaniṣads* by such statements as "to know Brahman is to be Brahman" (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*).

Chapter 3 The Abhidharma Context of Non-Origination (*Ajātivāda*)

1. A common name for Śaṅkara's doctrine is *kevalādvaita*—the non-dualism of the alone; this conforms very nicely with the Latin derivation of the English term "absolute."

2. As is the case with the translation of all technical terms from the original Sanskrit, one has to be aware of the loss of some of the meaning by the utilization of one fixed English equivalent. In this case the use of own, self

or intrinsic "nature" palpably fails to display the connection of the ter *svabhāva* with the question of being itself (*bhāva*). Thus, I have adopted th policy of freely rendering *svabhāva* as "intrinsic nature," own nature," "ow being," "self-establishment," and "self-sufficiency" etc., according to th context, in order that the wide connotations of this term will be taken on boar by the reader. That this is fair can be ascertained from the fact that in virtuall all cases these terms are exchangeable without a change in meaning.

3. *Svabhāva* and the related notion of *prakrti* (nature) occur in th following verses of the *Gaudapādīya-kārikā*- I.23, II.34, III.32, IV.7–10, 2 29, 57, 81, 86, 91–93, 98.

4. Both the Sthaviras and the Sarvāstivādins agree that the *bhikkh* Śāriputra was, during the Buddha's lifetime (he died six months before th Buddha), instructed to carry out elaborations along Abhidharmic lines. Yet th summaries (e.g. Vaiśali) may well be apocryphal. The *Suttanipāta*, one of th earliest Pali collections, contains hardly any of the well-known doctrin formulations found in the other *sūtras*. They are also absent from the Aśoka edicts (which were probably intended for the laity in any case). It could b argued, therefore, that the *mātrkās* are fairly late compositions. Watanab however, cite the occurrence of the term "*mātikā*" in the *Vinaya* and *Sutt pitakas*, and maintains that in the earliest period *mātrkās* were "rehearse in *abhidhamma* study." Despite attempts at a reconstruction of these "prot Abhidharmic" lists, however, little can be deduced about their doctrinal inten

5. Warder, argues that it is probable that the earliest form of th *Abhidharmapitaka* consisted of a set of *Mātrkā* readings, perhaps eve propounded by the Buddha himself, and that it was only later that these headin developed into the systematic Abhidharma taxonomies. See Warder, *India Buddhism* (Second Edition), p. 10.

6. See Takakusu (1956), *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, (EBP (Honolulu), pp. 58–59. See also Watanabe (1983), *Philosophy and i Development in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma*, pp. 42–43 and p. 45, sectio 4.4.

7. See Bareau, *Les Premiers Conciles Bouddhiques* (Paris, 1955), p 115–118 and Bareau *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, (Paris, 1956) p. 3

8. Warder, ibid., p. 274.

9. Takakusu (1956), *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 58.

10. Takakusu "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins" i *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, (1904–1905), p. 71.

11. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, p. 342; Takakusu (1956), *The Essentials Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 59.

12. Dutt, *Buddhist Sects in India*, pp. 152–158.